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RESEARCHERS FIND WHEN POLLUTION TAXES BALANCE TARRIFS, 
SMALL DEVELOPING NATIONS CAN PROTECT ENVIRONMENT 
DAYTON, Ohio -In general, an active environmental policy will benefit both the 
environment and the welfare of citizens in small developing countries that have trading 
capacities, according to a new study that refutes the conventional wisdom that developing 
countries must choose between industrial profits and protecting the environment. 
"A Dynamic Analysis of Protection and Environmental Policy in a Small Trading 
Developing Country" will be presented Sunday, Jan. 7, at the Allied Social Sciences 
Associations national meeting in New Orleans. Researchers Hamid Beladi, professor of 
economics and finance who holds the Niehaus Chair in business administration at the 
University of Dayton, and Amitrajeet Batabyal, the Arthur J. Gosnell professor of economics at 
the Rochester Institute of Technology co-wrote the study that will be presented at 10:15 a.m. at 
the Hilton New Orleans Riverside in the Norwich Room. 
The pair used a mathematical model to account for likely variables, such as tariffs to 
protect industry that competes with imports but also pollutes the environment and controlling 
pollution by taxing the production of the goods manufactured during the polluting process. The 
researchers also considered the practical length of time a government is able to commit to 
environmental regulations; the fact that workers, to earn higher wages, will abandon 
traditional, nonpolluting economic pursuits to seek work in the modem polluting industry; and 
effects on the general welfare of the people of the nation. 
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"The time incbnsistency of certain optimal programs may prevent the government from 
attaining its environmental and employment objectives," Beladi said. "And when the import-
competing industry is protected by a tariff, the government cannot use environmental policy to 
unambiguously raise welfare." 
When the pollution tax hinders overproduction that could otherwise be encouraged by 
the tariff, worker migration to the polluting industry is controlled and the economy is steady. 
The lack of overproduction and continuation of the traditional industry protects the 
environment. The government must continuously evaluate and adjust the pollution tax to keep 
it credible, the researchers found. 
It's evident from the model that countries must be active with their policies, Beladi said. 
"Our analysis shows that doing nothing; or setting a zero pollution tax, is not an optimal 
course of action," he said. "In every case that wt analyzed and no matter what the developing 
country's government's period of commitment, we showed that the optimal pollution tax is 
positive." 
But the model doesn't predict a solution that's easy to carry out, the researchers found. 
The policy that leads to the greatest environmental protection is the one that provides 
the least payoff for the government, Beladi said, And, conversely, the policy that gives the 
government the most payoff provides the least protection for the environment. 
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For media interviews, contact Hamid Beladi at (937) 229-2407 or via e-mail at 
beladi@udayton.edu. For a copy of the study, contact Pam Huber at (937) 229-3241 or via e-mail 
at huber@udayton.edu. 
